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 Introduction Here is an attractively simple picture about practical rationality, with
two elements. is is an
author’s
pre-
publication
draft of a
paper to be
published in
Philosophy
and
Phenomeno-
logical
Research.
. (Judgment) There is a relationship between states of aﬀairs which we might call all-
things-considered-betterness. Some states of aﬀairs are better than others. A rational
agent aims to form accurate judgments about the relative betterness ranking of avail-
able options.¹
So some states of aﬀairs are better than others, in this highly inclusive sense of “bet-
ter”. Some states of aﬀairs are equally good, and perhaps yet other states of aﬀairs
are unranked by the betterness relation. The betterness relation, we suppose, is tran-
sitive and asymmetric. Betterness, then, gives rise to at least a (strict) partial ordering
over states of aﬀairs.
. (Action) Having formed judgments about which outcomes are better than others, at
least some part of rational agency is concerned with acting so as to bring about rela-
tively good outcomes. Many philosophers have thought that this concern is not ex-
haustive of practical reason or of morality in particular, but it would be an extreme
and I daresay fanatical view which denied that seeking desirable consequences was
of any importance whatsoever.²
Other things being equal then, a rational agent seeks to bring about states of aﬀairs
that are judgedmaximal, given the betterness relation. That is, from a set of possible
. Of course, in natural language, there aremany diﬀerent senses of thewords “good”, “better”, and “best”, but it
is tempting to think that we can identify one all encompassing sense that is relevant for practical rationality.
This is what is intended by ‘all-things-considered-betterness’. Even if you are sceptical that there is such an
all-inclusive sense of betterness (Thomson : –), it does seem plausible to think that there is a sense
of betterness that is all-inclusive of what is relevant to prudent behaviour: “all things considered, better for
me”. The arguments of this paper can be taken to apply only to that narrower notion, if the reader prefers.
. See, e.g., John Rawls: “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging
rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy” (: ).

states of aﬀairs that the agent can bring about, she will aim to bring about the best.
Or if there is no unique best outcome, she will seek to bring about an outcome that
is at least not worse than any other outcome she could have achieved.
Larry Temkin and Stuart Rachels have each separately, in a number of publications
(Rachels , , ; Temkin , , ), argued that we have serious rea-
son to think that the above picture is false. In particular, Temkin and Rachels claim there is
good reason to think that the betterness relation does not constitute an ordering, because the
relation is not transitive. So there may be cases where although A is better than B, and B is
better than C, it is not the case that A is better than C. This is a very surprising suggestion.
Even more surprisingly, Temkin and Rachels argue that the betterness relation may ad-
mit cycles, in that there exist states of aﬀairs {S, …, Sn} such that S > S > … > Sn− > Sn,
and yet also Sn > S.
The picture I sketched above has a lot of plausibility. The idea that the betterness relation
is transitive and acyclic seems extremely plausible. The contrary idea that it admits cycles
is regarded by many as crazy. Why do Temkin and Rachels think we should even consider
such odd ideas? In his recent book, Rethinking the Good (), Temkinmarshals a range of
ingenious examples to illustrate inconsistency between various deeply held views about our
practical ideals, both moral and prudential. His arguments appear to show that, if we wish
to hold on to these ideals, we will have to abandon the transitivity of betterness. Temkin
does not claim that we have decisive reason to reject transitivity as the best response to his
arguments, but that it is an option worthy of very serious consideration.
In this paper, I develop an alternative response to a central kind of example that Temkin,
in particular, uses to motivate his argument. (I take much of what I say to be relevant to
Rachels’s position also, but focus on Temkin’s presentation as the most recent and most
thoroughly developed specimen.) The response is to show that plausible hypotheses about
how real agents might behave in situations resembling Temkin’s example support alterna-
tive hypotheses about the structure of the betterness relation. In particular, I claim that
we can imagine hypothetical agents whose behaviour does not look obviously irrational, is
consistent with transitivity, but which will suggest non-trivial incompleteness in the better-
ness relation. Another way to put this is to say that the value ordering that is relevant for
practical rationality is incomplete. Yet another way to put this is to say that there may be
instances of incomparable or incommensurate value that are relevant for practical rational-
ity. This alternative hypothesis – which is consistent with the sketch of practical rationality
given above – at least deserves serious consideration as a better account of the nature of

value than Temkin’s and Rachels’s radical proposals.
 Temkin’s example Temkin presents his central example in the context of four “views”
about the nature of betterness. For convenience, I will use four propositions that diverge
somewhat from Temkin’s original claims (see note), but are nonetheless very similar in
plausibility.³ By using these claims, I can avoid using examples that involve extremely far-
fetched scenarios, which I take to be an importantmethodological advantage.My formula-
tions also enable me to remain neutral on a controversial aspect of Temkin’s views, which
will be explained below. But if the reader thinks that my modiﬁcation of Temkin’s views
renders them signiﬁcantly less plausible, it is easy enough to see how to reconstruct the
ensuing argument so as to target the original claims.
V: For any unpleasant or negative experience, no matter what the intensity and du-
ration of that experience, it would be better to have that experience than one that
was only a little less intense but suﬃciently longer in duration.
V: There is, or could be, a spectrum of unpleasant or negative experiences ranging in
intensity, for example, from extreme forms of torture to the mild discomfort of a
mosquito bite, such that one could move from the harsh end of the spectrum to
themild end in a ﬁnite series of steps, where each step would involve the transfor-
mation from one negative experience to another that was only a little less intense
than the previous one.
. Temkin’s initial formulation of the four views is as follows (p. ):
(V) For any unpleasant or “negative” experience, no matter what the intensity and duration of that ex-
perience, it would be better to have that experience than one that was only a “little” less intense but
twice (or three or ﬁve times) as long.
(V) There is, or could be, a spectrum of unpleasant or “negative” experiences ranging in intensity, for
example, from extreme forms of torture to the mild discomfort of a mosquito bite, such that one
could move from the harsh end of the spectrum to the mild end in a ﬁnite series of steps, where
each step would involve the transformation from one negative experience to another that was only
a “little” less intense than the previous one.
(V) The mild discomfort of a mosquito bite would be better than two years of excruciating torture, no
matter how long one lived and no matter how long the discomfort of a mosquito bite persisted.
(V) “All-things-considered-better-than” is a transitive relation. So, for any three outcomes, A, B, and C,
which involve unpleasant experiences of varying intensities and durations, if, all things considered,
A is better than B, and B is better than C, then A is better than C.

V: Themild discomfort of amosquito bite, endured for  years, would be better than
enduring one month of excruciating torture.
V: “All-things-considered-better-than” is a transitive relation.
You may complain that the terms “little” and “suﬃcient” are vague, and it is therefore
not clear that we should accept these claims. What we require is a spectrum of experiences
such that, on a consistent reading of these vague terms, V–Vmight all be true. So in that
spirit, I suggest the following series of unpleasant experiences, such that each change in
intensity is “little”, and each change in duration is “suﬃcient”, such that each experience
on the list is better than the preceding experience. (If you do not like this example, I invite
you to invent your own, for it does seem plausible that there will be some spectra and some
precisiﬁcations of these terms, such that the claims V and V are true.)
A. Excruciating torture ( month)
A. Vicious torture ( months)
A. Serious torture ( months)
A. Mild torture ( months)
A. Food poisoning plus a sprained ankle ( year)
A. Food poisoning plus a bee sting ( months)
A. Food poisoning ( years)
A. Bad ﬂu ( years)
A. Migraine ( years)
A. Sprained ankle ( years)
A. Bee sting ( years)
A. Mosquito bite ( years)
By V, A is better than A. Although A involves more intense unpleasantness, it is of
suﬃciently shorter duration that it is better to undergo A than to undergo A. Similarly,
A is better than A; A is better than A; and so on, for all adjacent pairs in the list A–
A.
Given the betterness relations above, and given the transitivity of betterness (V), it
follows that A is better than A.
But by V, A is better than A. Contradiction.
Temkin says that it is very diﬃcult to give up any of V, V, or V. He suggests that it
might bemost plausible to give up V. If so, we can avoid the contradiction, because we can

coherently deny that A > A. The conjunction: A > A > A > A … > A is true. But
if it is nonetheless false that A is better than A, then it is consistent to say that A is
better than A. This is the essence of Temkin’s argument against transitivity of betterness:
it allows us consistently to endorse V–V.
Before discussing Temkin’s view further below, it is worth reﬂecting a little longer on the
plausibility of V–V.
 Initial response to the example If one ﬁnds that one has a number of inconsistent
beliefs, a sensible strategy is to ask which belief canmost readily be given up. Which of our
four views has the lowest credence, for instance? I will put aside V for consideration in
the context of Temkin’s speciﬁc arguments below. Regarding the three other views, I am
probably most conﬁdent about V, or something close enough to it.
Note that my version of V is in one way a good deal weaker than Temkin’s original
(see note ). Temkin claims that the qualitative badness of excruciating torture is so bad
that a suﬃciently long episode of torture is worse than any duration of enduring a trivial
discomfort, such as amosquito bite. In eﬀect, while V asserts that quality and quantity of
painful experiences can always be traded oﬀ against each other, Temkin’s formulation of V
ﬂatly denies this, by asserting that there are some qualitative diﬀerences that are so great
that they lexically dominate quantitative diﬀerences. The lexical dominance claim is very
strong, and accordingly has been the subject of independent criticism.⁴ I doubt, moreover,
that we are well equipped to weigh up the badness of – for instance –  million years
of enduring a mosquito bite versus the badness of two years of torture. Our imaginative
powers regarding large numbers and long durations are too limited to be reliable.⁵ But I
suggest that we ignore this dispute for present purposes.We can at least agree with Temkin
thatmany, many years of enduring a mosquito bite is much better than enduring two years
of excruciating torture. Or, to use the cases I oﬀered,  years of enduring a mosquito bite
is surely much better than  month of excruciating torture. So although I am sceptical of
Temkin’s original claim, I believe that some proposition suﬃciently strong to generate the
problem should be given high credence.
V is also very plausible, though I have slightly lower conﬁdence in it than in V, be-
. E.g. Broome : §., Norcross .
. Though see various passages in Temkin , especially chapter , for Temkin’s response to concerns of this
sort.

cause V implies a large number of phenomenological claims which could be empirically
disconﬁrmed. Obviously, the phenomenal characters of a mosquito bite and of torture are
very diﬀerent. But it does seem plausible that there is a possible spectrum of experiences
that gets you from one to the other, such that there is only a relatively small phenomenal
diﬀerence, in terms of unpleasantness, between each adjacent pair.⁶
That leaves us with V. Because this is a claim about all unpleasant experiences that
diﬀer only a little in intensity, it is hard to be conﬁdent that it will be unrestrictedly true.
Indeed, Temkin grants that, strictly speaking, Vmaybe false (p. ). Theremaybe “little”
diﬀerences in intensity where the trade-oﬀ of increased pain for reduced duration does not
favour the shorter butmore intense experience. But he claims that therewill be some spectra,
which both satisfy V and are such that V is true of all the unpleasant experiences in the
spectrum. That is all he requires to generate the paradox.
How conﬁdent shouldwe be of this claim? It does sound plausible, but comparedwithV
andV, I think it has to be the least plausible. Suppose we tried to apply it to the spectrum I
came up with above (A–A). V amounts to the claim that every item in that list is better
than the following. And while that does not seem a crazy thing to think, it is a “big claim”,
compared to V andV. (Of course, Temkin does not have to agreewithmy suggestion that
V is true of this spectrum, but he must be committed to a similarly strong claim about
some spectrum.) V is a claim about the relative betterness of only two things, and the
contrast between them is very stark. V is a claim about the existence of phenomenological
continua which seems plausible enough. But V is another evaluative claim, which entails
a large conjunction of evaluations that applies to all adjacent pairs of a spectrum. It seems
obvious to me that if there is a place to raise doubts, this is it.⁷
So, of V–V, I claim that V is the most dubious. Temkin, on the other hand, claims
that we should seriously consider rejecting V. How does V compare in plausibility to V?
. Warren Quinn discusses similar cases in Quinn . Though Quinn’s case has the additional diﬃculty that
adjacent points in the spectrum are indiscriminable.
. Notice that the quality of the unpleasant experiences on the spectrum A–A varies signiﬁcantly. Jakob
Hohwy suggested to me that we might think that we could obtain a more reliable case in favour of V if we
ensured a greater degree of homogeneity across the spectrum. But if we do this, the rewritten version of V
will be much less plausible. If the experiences at both ends of the spectrum are qualitatively similar, then
we will not be as conﬁdent that the intense but shorter experience is worse than the longer, less intense
experience.

. How can we evaluate structural claims about betterness? It is typical to assume that
the betterness relation is asymmetric and transitive. These ideas are seemingly so basic to
our understanding of the relation that it is hard to tell how one could obtain evidence that
they were incorrect. Inspired by this phenomenon, onemight try to argue that, as a matter
of conceptual truth, or as a matter of logic, betterness must be transitive.⁸ This argument,
however, is open to the reply – which Temkin indeedmakes – that “youmay be right about
traditional concepts of betterness, but I am inviting you to use a new concept, which better
ﬁts with our other ideals about practical rationality such as V–V”.⁹ I think that pursuing
this line of argument further is unlikely to be fruitful.
Another possible response is to try to investigate the role of evaluative beliefs in our
ordinary folk psychological theorising. Would a surprising claim about the structure of
betterness have implications for how we should think about the behaviour of our friends,
colleagues, and ourselves?
Recall the picture I described at the beginning of the paper. Practical rationality involves
two elements: judgment and action. Judgment is coming to a view about the relative value
of outcomes, and action involves seeking to bring about better outcomes. If we accept
Temkin’s proposal regarding the nature of value then we may have to revise some of our
judgments, and this will have further implications for how we should act.
One problematic implication of nontransitivity of betterness is that it is compatible with
cyclical judgments about betterness. Indeed, Temkin is claiming that for spectra that meet
the requirements of V–V, betterness relations in fact do form a cycle (see Figure  for an
illustration). Cyclical betterness judgments, however, may rationally require us to submit
to a “money pump”.¹⁰ Suppose that you start out in A. You are oﬀered the opportunity
to purchase, at a minimal cost, relief from A and to be put in A instead. This is an
attractive oﬀer, because you regard A to be better than A. You accept. Now you are
made a similar oﬀer to exchange A for A. This looks like a good deal also. And so on.
Eventually, you get to A, having paid out lots of small quantities of money. You are now
. See, e.g. Broome : §..
. Temkin : §§., .. Rachels canvasses the possibility of a similar reply, though he does not personally
endorse it (Rachels : –).
. The original money pump idea is presented in Davidson, McKinsey, and Suppes .
Johan Gustafsson has recently shown how a money-pump can be constructed, even for an agent whose
preferences are intransitive but acyclic (Gustafsson ). It is easier to present the problem as it arises for
agents with cyclic preferences, however, so I focus only on that case.

…A10
A11
A12
A3
A2
A1
Figure : A graph of the alleged betterness relations between the states A–A. An arrow
from x to y indicates x is better than y. Because Temkin denies transitivity, one cannot infer
from arrows running from x to z through y that x is also better than z.
oﬀered A. Again, you think that A is better than A, so you are rationally required to
accept. You have returned to where you begun, while paying out money at every step. But
at each step, you believed you were rationally required to accept the trade because you were
oﬀered a trade to a better state of aﬀairs.
The money pump argument is oﬀered as part of the traditional justiﬁcation for why our
preferences should be transitive. By giving up transitivity, Temkin seems to be inviting the
conclusion that it is rational to be money-pumped in a situation like this.
Note the structure of the argument here:
P. If betterness is nontransitive, then agents might be rationally required to accept
a series of money pump trades.
P. Accepting a series of money-pump trades is manifestly irrational.
C. Therefore betterness is transitive.
Temkin’s response is to deny the ﬁrst premiss. He claims that only dubious claims about
rationality will support money-pumping in the face of nontransitive betterness cycles. In
particular, consider the following rule of rational action.
Local maximization: If, at a given time, you face a number of options S, such that one
option x in S is better than all other options in S, bring about x.
The local maximizer, because she considers only what is better out of the available op-
tions at a given time, will indeed be vulnerable to money pumping, as described above. So

if we accepted the local maximization rule as a complete account of rational action, then
the objection would appear to succeed. Temkin quite rightly points out, however, that local
maximization is not an entirely plausible theory of rational choice (§.). Local maximiz-
ers will never be able to make short-term sacriﬁces for the sake of long-term gains. They
presumably will never have reason to quit smoking, to start exercising, or to study hard at
school. This sort of behaviour is frequently symptomatic of irrationality, so local maximiz-
ing is not a good account of rationality.
So far, so good. But it is incumbent upon Temkin to provide some alternative account of
rational choice, and to explain how, conjoined with evaluative judgments that violate tran-
sitivity, the agent will avoid manifestly irrational behaviour. This is not a trivial matter.
Wlodek Rabinowicz () has shown that even agents who decide using a form of fore-
sight, by employing a backwards induction technique, will be vulnerable to money-pumps
if they have cyclic preferences.
A rule of rational choice that might be used to avoid money-pumping is:
Global maximization: If, over an anticipated series of choices, you face a total set of op-
tions S, such that by an appropriate series of choices you can end upwith any element
in S, then make a series of choices which leads to a maximal item in S.¹¹
The global maximizer, if able to anticipate the same series of choices as above, will say:
“There is no maximal item in S, since for every item in S, some other item is better. So
my rule gives me no guidance. All behaviour is equally rational or irrational.” The global
maximizer, then,might choose A over all alternatives – that is the globalmaximizermight
choose the excruciating torture. Although this is choosing an item that is in some sense
“less good” than what could have been chosen (e.g. A), every other choice is “less good”
than something else also.
(Note that global maximizing, although an attractive ideal, requires that an agent have
abundant information regarding future choices in order to be eﬀective. Real agents may
want to behave like a global maximizer, but must do so with less than full information
about future choice opportunities. It is for this reason that more short-sighted strategies
. Temkin mentions these rules, but does not follow through exactly what global maximization appears to en-
tail (§.). Temkin is following Elster’s inﬂuential discussion (Elster ). See also Edward McClennen’s
proposal that an agent may employ resolute choice, which is very similar to the proposal above (McClen-
nen ). Rabinowicz (), exploring these ideas further, argues that under certain conditions, resolute
agents with cyclic preferences can avoid being money-pumped, but expresses doubts about the rationality of
being resolute.

like local maximization retain some interest. This matter will be revisited below.)
In itself, global maximizing is a reasonably plausible account of rational choice. But to
suppose that someone is behaving rationally by choosing at random from the spectrum
A–A is absurd. It also seems extremely far-fetched to suppose that any real individ-
ual – rational or otherwise – would have such an attitude. So the conjunction of (i) global
maximization as an account of action and (ii) nontransitivity of betterness as a feature of
rational judgment seems to have utterly implausible implications for practical rationality.
Here is what Temkin says to this end:
[S]trictly speaking all the money pump shows is that in certain circumstances
it would be irrational to both retain, and repeatedly act on one’s nontransitive
preferences. So, for example, it is assumed that part of the circumstances is
that people have an overarching aim that their lives go well in ways that would
be precluded if they allowed themselves to go broke by being repeatedlymoney
pumped. If people didn’t have such an overarching preference, or didn’t allow
themselves to act on their nontransitive preferences, it is hard to see how the
mere possibility of beingmoneypumped in virtue of their havingnontransitive
preferences would be enough to make people irrational. (Temkin : )
Stuart Rachels engages with the money pump objection in similar fashion:
Suppose we reject Transitivity in favour of the following thesis: for some pos-
sibilities, X is hedonically better than Y, Y is better than Z, but X is worse
than Z. On a variant of the “money-pump” objection, an informed agent, who
holds the thesis and is otherwise rational, would pay a small amount to trade
X for Z (since Z is better), then pay a small amount to trade Z for Y (since Y
is better), then pay a small amount to trade Y for X (since X is better) – the
same X she started with. So, according to this objection, the thesis must be re-
jected. But the objection fails. The rational agent will not behave like this for
exactly the reasonwhy doing so seems irrational; because, from the standpoint
of self-interest, one might as well put dollar bills down the garbage disposal.
The money-pump objection assumes that a rational agent would always prefer
what is better and act on those preferences, no matter what. But that assump-
tion would be rejected along with Transitivity.
(Rachels : )
But neither Rachels nor Temkin seems – at least in the passages quoted – to grasp the

full force of the objection.¹²Wehave adopted a hypothesis about value relations that should
make sense of an agent’s behaviour, on the assumption that the agent is broadly rational.¹³
On two particular hypotheses about rational behaviour, however – global maximization
and local maximization – we get predicted behaviour that looks manifestly irrational.¹⁴
Global maximizing looks like a relatively good hypothesis about rationality. If there is
something wrong with it, then we should be given some sort of diagnosis of the error. But
instead of that, Temkin and Rachels appeal to an ad hoc “overarching” preference not to
go broke, or to an unexplained practice of “not acting” on nontransitive preferences. Apart
from their inherent implausibility, these moves are inadequate. Consider again our global
maximizer who is free to choose any of the outcomes A–A, without any associated cost.
She says: “There is no best option, so I am indiﬀerent”, and chooses at random, ending up
with A: excruciating torture. This seems consistent with having a preference not to be
money pumped and consistent with not repeatedly acting on nontransitive preferences,
but it still seems irrational. The intuition that Temkin and Rachels rely upon to support
V is that A – a reasonably long period of excruciating torture – is a very bad outcome. If
that is so, surely a rational agent should take steps to avoid it.
What, then, is a more realistic response, and is there anything that can be said as to how
rational that response is?
 An alternative account If we wanted to know what an agent’s beliefs were about the
betterness ranking of the items A–A and, in particular, whether they were committed
to the transitivity of betterness, a number of diﬀerent empirical approaches could be used.
. Characterising Temkin’s overall position on thismatter is a delicatematter: while he does not explicitly aﬃrm
scepticism about practical reason, and attempts to carry out the argument of the book under non-sceptical
assumptions, he recognises that his views may provide good reasons for such scepticism. See §. for his
most explicit discussion of this.
. As Davidson writes (Davidson : ):
Making sense of the utterances and behaviour of others, even their most aberrant behaviour,
requires us to ﬁnd a great deal of reason and truth in them. To see too much unreason on the
part of others is simply to undermine our ability to understand what it is they are so unrea-
sonable about.
. Another possibility is that rational action involves satisﬁcing, and again, satisﬁcing will have local and global
variations. I see no reason, however, to think that this will assist Temkin to explain why choosing at random
from the spectrum is not a rational response for the global satisﬁcer.

Putting aside the serious diﬃcultieswewould have in obtaining ethics committee approval,
two approaches of interest are the following:
. Binary choice experiments. The agent is endowed with one item from the spectrum,
and oﬀered the opportunity to trade it for an adjacent item. So for instance, the agent
will be givenA and then asked if shewishes to trade it for A. In another experiment
the agent will be given A and asked if she wishes to trade it for A. And so on, for all
adjacent pairs in the spectrum.We should also ask the agent to make a binary choice
between A and A.
Ideally, the experiment should be arranged in some fashion to ensure that the agent
(i) is not sure whether any given choice will be her last, leaving her stuck with the
most recent choice, and also (ii) does not believe that future choices to be oﬀered
depend on present choices made. Given these restrictions, the agent will need to rely
on relatively “local” evaluations of the two options on oﬀer, rather than be able to use
strategic considerations to bring about desirable choice scenarios in future, which are
likely to be a confounding factor.
. Free choice experiments. We tell the agent that she is going to be put in one of the
options A–A, but that she can choose which. The agent then chooses freely.
This sort of experiment, provided the agent believes that the choice is ﬁnal, will al-
low the agent to adopt a global maximizing strategy over the whole spectrum, and
thus gives information about the overall structure of her betterness judgments that
complements the binary choice experiments.
In addition to these experimental paradigms, we could employ subtle variations such
as binary choices between pairs that are not immediately adjacent; or free choices from
subsets of the spectrum. No doubt other protocols will yield useful information also.
To motivate an alternative understanding of the value relations between the states on
our spectrum, I ask the reader to indulge me in a rather detailed speculation about how an
agentmight respond in experiments of these sorts. It is my hope that, even if the imagined
behaviour is not obviously rational, it will, after further analysis, appear to be a rational
response to choice scenarios of this sort, yet preserve transitivity.
Story of Subject S Our subject S is taken through a series of binary choice ex-
periments. S frequently agrees that items from earlier in the spectrum (shorter
duration, more intense experiences) are better than longer duration pains of
lesser intensity. So A > A, A > A, etc. Moreover, S agrees that mosquito

bites are better than torture, so if given the choice between A and A, he
takes A.
At two points in the series of experiments, however, S is reluctant to trade.
For instance, when considering the trade from A to A, he says: “Gee, a mi-
graine for  years is pretty bad. But I do hate having the ﬂu too. And  years
of having the ﬂu is still a very long time. I’m really not sure what to do here. I
think I’ll just stop.”
S shows a similar reluctance to trade at a second point – suppose it is from
A to A.
Upon further experimentation, it becomes apparent that S’s reluctance to
trade from A to A, for instance, does not reﬂect a straightforward preference
for A over A, because when S is endowed with A and is oﬀered a trade to
A, he is again reluctant to trade. So for both points in the spectrum where S
is reluctant to trade, the reluctance is symmetrical, and S prefers to retain the
bundle with which he is currently endowed.
On further investigation, S’s reluctance to trade is robust under perturba-
tions that our experimenters call “mild sweetening”.¹⁵ For instance, the inves-
tigators say that, instead of trading from A to A, S can trade from A to an
enhanced version of A, where he will be paid a bonus of . S is reluctant to
take this trade also. (And similarly, he is reluctant to trade from A to a sweet-
ened version of A.)
Finally, in a free choice experiment, S reports having diﬃculty in choos-
ing between A and A. Eventually, S chooses A, but reports that he simply
“plumped” for that option on a relatively arbitrary basis. Having chosen, how-
ever, he is reluctant to trade A for A, and again this is a reluctance that is
insensitive to mild sweetening.
The behaviour of S is, at ﬁrst inspection, somewhat mysterious. It is not obvious what
rational strategy S is following. But nor is it obvious that S is behaving irrationally. Unlike
an agent who chooses from the spectrum at random, S appears to have a deﬁnite strategy,
and that strategy could be an attempt to act rationally, consistently with the account of
rationality given at the beginning of the paper.
. I take this terminology from Caspar Hare ().

I suggest that S’s behaviour can be interpreted elegantly if we suppose that he has the
following value commitments:
• A and A are incommensurate in value, as are A and A.¹⁶
Incommensurability of value can be understood, in this context, as simply the denial of
any other value relations. A and B are incommensurate if and only if A is not better than
B, nor is B better than A, nor are they equal in value. Given incommensurability, the graph
in Figure  is a plausible illustration of the value relations endorsed by S. Note that this
interpretation is intended to include the assumption that betterness is transitive.
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Figure : Posited value relations endorsed by subject S. In this graph, it is assumed that
betterness is transitive, so additional arrows are implied between, for instance, A and A.
The value relations posited in Figure  ﬁt reasonably well with rational choice strategies
such as globalmaximizing in free choice experiments and localmaximizing in binary choice
experiments. The local maximizer who is started out at A will accept trades to A, to A,
etc., all the way to A if possible. Similarly, the local maximizer who commences at A will
accept trades to each of A, A, and A. The global maximizer, given a free choice, will
clearly identify A and A as maximal choices. Neither is uniquely best, but they are the
. There is some potential for terminological confusion on this point. Some say “roughly equal”, some say “in-
commensurate” or “incomparable”, some say “on a par”, and some draw subtle distinctions between these.
For my purposes, I will ignore these distinctions, and will say that two goods are incommensurate (or incom-
parable) if and only if it is not the case that one is better than the other, nor is it the case that they are equal
in value.
See Broome ; Chang , ; Hsieh ; Rabinowicz  for a variety of terminological pro-
posals. See also Parﬁt : §.

only choices which cannot be bettered. This ﬁts with the supposition that S ﬁnds only these
two choiceworthy, but has trouble deciding between them.
One aspect of S’s behaviour that is not entirely explained, however, is the symmetric
reluctance to trade between, for instance, A and A. A local maximizer, choosing between
A and A, should arguably be indiﬀerent. Although these two options are not equal in
value, nor is it the case that one is better than the other. So one might think that the local
maximizing agent should behave similarly to an agent who held them to be equal in value.
Michael Mandler, a theoretical economist, has shown that, for agents with incomplete
value functions, in a broad class of choice problems, a strategy of status quomaintenance
(SQM) will guarantee that the agent avoids sub-optimal outcomes (Mandler ). SQM is
a strategy which says: when choosing between something you are currently endowed with
and an exchange for something else, only exchange if the alternative item is strictly better,
otherwise retain your current endowment.
SQM is a heuristic that is widely observed in human decision making and traditionally
has been explained by invoking a temporal shift in preferences, such that agents come to
prefer retaining what they currently hold more strongly than they originally preferred to
obtain that bundle of goods. Mandler argues that the preference shift hypothesis is em-
pirically unfalsiﬁable, since it is very diﬃcult to assess an agent’s preferences for an option
without at some point changing the agent’s endowments over the course of an experiment.
By supposing that agents have incomplete preferences, however, we can retain a stable
structure of preferences and explain the behaviour in a plausible fashion (Mandler ).
Crudely, the rationale for this heuristic is that it makes the agent less vulnerable to
money pumps than she would otherwise be, if she were relatively willing to trade between
incomparable pairs. For instance, suppose an agent endorsed the valuations in Figure ,
and were endowed with A. She is then oﬀered a trade to A, which she accepts, on the
basis that she is willing to trade between incomparable goods. She is then oﬀered another
trade, to A. She accepts this also, and ﬁnds that she has ended up with an option that
is strictly inferior to one she could have had (A). Now, it is true that an agent who is an
eﬀective global maximizer might be able to anticipate this outcome and intervene in her
willingness to trade. But not every agent will be in a position to anticipate this sequence of
trades, nor to notice it once it is underway. Eﬀectively, SQM gives an agent who has only
local information some of the beneﬁts that the agent would have, if she were able to engage

in global maximization.¹⁷
SQM is an independently motivated heuristic, then, which allows us to explain subject
S’s reluctance to trade between pairs that are believed to be incomparable, such as A and
A.
So the emerging picture of Subject S is as follows:
• S endorses the truth of V and V.
• S denies V, because he holds that there are at least two pairs in the spectrum which
are incomparable.
• S endorses the transitivity of betterness (V).
• S uses a strategy of SQM for choice situations involving incomparable options. This
leads to a reluctance to trade that looks superﬁcially arbitrary, but which can eﬀec-
tively protect S from a variety of potential money-pumps.
(Of course, the particular value judgments that I ascribed to S, for the purposes of the
example, are only one way to satisfy the above schema. Another response would be for an
agent tomanifest reluctance to trade acrossmanymore pairs in the spectrum. The extreme
case of this dispositionwould be an agentwho judgedAbetter thanA, but all other pairs
from the spectrum to be incomparable. Such an agent would reliably pick anything other
than A in a free choice experiment, but would be reluctant to accept any trades, expect to
trade A in preference to A.)
I cannot prove that S’s psychology is better attuned to practical reason than Temkin’s
proposal to endorse V–V and reject transitivity. Nor do I claim that S’s psychology is the
. Erik Carlson proposes a rule of rational decision for agents with cyclic preferences which appears to have
some structural similarities to SQM. Carlson’s rule, which is speciﬁcally intended for cases like Quinn’s self-
torturer, but which is intended to govern global choices, rather than binary choices, is
Choose the latest setting which is preferred to each earlier setting. (Carlson : )
Here ‘setting’ refers to a setting on adevicewhich delivers electric shocks of increasing intensity, ranging from
no shock (setting ) to an excruciating pain (setting ). He concedes that this rule introduces a seemingly
arbitrary element in this decision rule: ‘Which option it selects depends on our choice of a “starting point”’
(). He goes on to say, however, that ‘the choice of  as a starting point can be justiﬁed. It is intuitively
clear, in the case of the self-torturer, that a reasonable decision rule should select only settings preferred
to . Apart from , which we know is dispreferred to , this intuitive constraint does not hold for any
other setting… A decision rule should therefore select a setting which is, loosely speaking, as much better
than  as possible’ (ibid). I confess to ﬁnding this passage unclear. I cannot see any reason to ascribe to  this
special status, except for the fact that it constitutes the status quo. So Carlson’s rule either presupposes the
reasonableness of SQM, or appeals to some other consideration which is opaque to me.

only conceivable rational response to these sorts of experiments. There may well be other
possibilities, and they may not need to rely on incommensurability judgments. My claim
is just that the proposed interpretation of S’s experimental responses involves a much less
radical departure from orthodoxy than Temkin’s proposal. In particular, we can explain, on
the account given of S, why it would be a disastrous policy to choose from the spectrum at
random.
Presumably, if one doubts the rationality of S’s response, a crucial point of contention
will be whether or not it is plausible that, in any spectrum of the sort described in V,
there will be at least two points where incomparability arises.¹⁸ Temkin may argue that,
if we make a suﬃciently ﬁne-grained spectrum – much more ﬁne-grained than the simple
example I have used – denying V will seem extremely implausible. Each and every step
in the spectrum will involve a very small change in intensity, and a dramatic change in
duration. Surely we should be able to conﬁdently say that badness of a longer duration
outweighs the goodness of a lesser intensity? And while we can agree with Temkin that
this will seem a very plausible thought for each and every step in the spectrum, we can
simply insist that our commitment to V, V, and V entail that we must ﬁnd fault with
V at some point, even if we are not conﬁdent which are the correct points at which to
baulk.
It is worth noting that, strictly speaking, Temkin never explicitly shows us where in the
pain spectrum there is a counterexample to transitivity; viz. three states, A, B, C such that
A > B, B > C, yet it is not the case that A > C. Rather, his argumentmerely shows that V, V,
and V imply that theremust be some such trio, and the pain spectrum is intended to illus-
trate the plausibility of those three premises. But as I mentioned above: V is inherently
less plausible than V and V; and the larger and more subtle the spectrum to which V is
intended to apply, the greater the threat to its credibility. We do better, I suggest, to doubt
V and retain V. Just as Temkin cannot tell us where the failure of transitivity occurs, I
. Why must the agent think that there are two points of incomparability? Couldn’t an agent be reluctant to
trade across only one pair in the spectrum? Of course, this is possible, and it is enough to ensure that the
betterness relation is acyclic. But for there to be non-trivial incomparability in a group of objects, at least
three objects are needed, such that at least one pair stands in a betterness relation, and at least two pairs do
not (Mandler : ). So for instance, if the agent merely refused to trade between A and A, but was
willing to trade for all other pairs, then it would seem that the agent was committed to A > A > … > A >
A. If we wished to endorse transitivity, then, the agent should accept that A > A, and the refusal to trade
is seemingly irrational.

cannot conﬁdently say where the incomparability occurs, but to admit incomparability is
less damaging than admitting non-transitivity.
A second point of contention will be whether it is possible to motivate this manner of
response to the entire range of cases where Temkin shows we are liable to run into similar
diﬃculties. Temkin claims that we have similar reasons to doubt transitivity in cases quite
unlike the pain spectrum – especially in cases involving population ethics. Although it is
reasonably easy to see how to generalize the strategy I have used in this paper, it is not
clear that it will be similarly plausible in all cases. I will have to leave discussion of those
cases for another occasion.
 Vagueness versus incommensurability The account I have oﬀered above is similar
in some ways to recent proposals by Christopher Knapp () and Mozaﬀar Qizilbash
(), both of whom claim that transitivity may be saved by allowing that the better than
relation is aﬀected by vagueness. This leads in turn to a sort of incompleteness of value,
because for some pairs of states of aﬀairs, it is not deﬁnitely true that one is better than
the other, nor is it deﬁnitely true that they are equal in value. So as far as what is deﬁnite
goes, there is an incompleteness in the betterness ranking. Below I brieﬂy describe the idea
behind these proposals, before going on to explain why the proposal developed above is at
the very least a useful alternative response – and quite likely a more powerful response –
to Temkin’s case for non-transitivity.
Both Knapp and Qizilbash suppose that although V and V are true, V is false. The
thought is that V is true when comparing qualitatively similar pains, but where a signif-
icant qualitative barrier is crossed, such as the barrier between awful pain and non-awful
pain, it is no longer true that trade-oﬀs of intensity for duration will satisfy V. It is the
crossing of some such qualitative barrier that is supposed to explain why V, as Temkin
originally formulates it, is true. Recall that Temkin’s original argument uses the claim that
some pains of suﬃcient intensity – such as a period of excruciating torture – are worse
than any duration of a mild pain – such as a mosquito bite.
The burden, then, is to explain why V seems so plausible, if it is supposed to be false.
The reason we have trouble noticing the falsity of V, according to this response, is that
the relevant qualitative predicates, such as ‘awful’, are vague. There are pains in the mid-
dle of the spectrum that are borderline cases. For such cases, it is not merely diﬃcult but
impossible to settle deﬁnitely whether they are awful or not.
So suppose that, for the sake of argument, A and A are both in the borderline region.

Can we deﬁnitely say that A is better than A, on grounds that A is only a little more
intense, but that A is of much greater duration? According to Knapp, we cannot, because
this implies that it is either deﬁnitely true that both A and A are awful, or it is deﬁnitely
true thatA andA are not awful.¹⁹ But neither of these is the case, because it is not deﬁnite
that A is awful and it is not deﬁnite that A is non-awful – that is just what it means to
be a borderline case. Exactly the same can be said of A.
(Personally, I am rather doubtful of this move. It seems entirely possible that we could
have two very similar items, both not deﬁnitely awful, but one of them is deﬁnitely worse
than the other. Temkin makes a similar complaint (: ). But I won’t press this ob-
jection here.)
The vagueness of the relevant qualitative barrier, then, means that not all of the entail-
ments of V are deﬁnitely true. Although we cannot say of any pair in the spectrum that it
is deﬁnitely a placewhereV is false, whenwe enter the borderline region, V’s entailments
will be neither deﬁnitely true nor deﬁnitely false. So in eﬀect, the ranking that corresponds
to deﬁnitely true betterness ascriptions contains gaps.
Provided that the borderline region includes at least two gaps in the ranking, this will
have a similar result as incommensurate value. Indeed, it can be seen as a special case of
incommensurability: it is incompleteness in what is deﬁnitely better. Being a special case,
this response has more limited dialectical power than my own response, for the following
reasons.
First, as I have already noted, Temkin’s version of V, with its implicit commitment to
the idea that some qualitative diﬀerences between pains lexically dominate quantitative
diﬀerences, is highly controversial. Consequently, it is desirable that a response to Temkin
and Rachels does not require that the lexical inferiority claim is true, because the threat to
transitivity does not depend on this claim – as shown by the reformulated version of the
argument discussed above. But both Qizilbash and Knapp rely upon the lexicality claim in
presenting their responses. It might be possible to reformulate their response to avoid this
feature, but if so, I suspect their responses will look yet more similar to my own.
Second, we might complain that we know very little about how vagueness in the better-
ness relation interacts with decision rules. I have oﬀered an account, drawing onMandler’s
work, of how incompleteness may justify the SQM choice strategy. But it is not clear that,
on all accounts of vagueness, this will be a justiﬁed response to incompleteness in the rank-
. Knapp : –. Qizilbash’s analysis is essentially similar, see Qizilbash : .

ing of what is deﬁnitely better. For instance, on an epistemicist reading of vagueness, it may
be the case that there is a unique maximal element in the spectrum, but that it is impos-
sible to know what this is. In that case, the appropriate choice strategy might be better
understood as involving choice under uncertainty as to whether a given item in the spec-
trum is best. It remains open that this could require quite diﬀerent choice strategies, whose
apparent rationality would require further defence.
In sum, while it is indeed plausible that betterness is a vague concept, it is not clear
that vagueness per se does the explanatory work in justifying the retention of transitivity.
Rather, it is the appeal to incompleteness in the betterness ranking and consideration of
desirable behavioural strategies in light of that, which does most of the explanatory work.
 Conclusion In conclusion, if we are to take the proposal of nontransitivity seriously,
its defenders need to provide us with an account of rational choice that is explicated with
a similar degree of rigour as SQM, and which will explain why rational agents would not be
required to behave in ways we take to be manifestly irrational. My alternative proposal ap-
pears to deliver at least that much. Moreover, my proposal shows that the appeal to vague-
ness in the betterness relation is merely a special case of a more general strategy, which
need not be committed to any controversial claims about the existence of lexical priorities
of value. Consequently, I suggest that my proposal is a preferable hypothesis.²⁰
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